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… despite the presence of excellent laws on the books, the enforcement and 
protection of [intellectual property rights] in China fall well below that provided for 
in its domestic laws and mandated by those international agreements to which China 
is a party.1 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of law in the People’s Republic of China has converged with the 
legal traditions of Europe, and more recently the United States of America, in a 
concerted effort to comply with international expectations.2 This is most evident in 
the case of intellectual property laws developed in China since the advent of the 
Open Door policy at the end of 1978.  
 
With the push towards membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) came 
the need to further develop these intellectual property laws in order to comply with 
the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement). This has been an issue of importance for 
many Asian nations. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to bring convergence in the way intellectual 
property rights are protected around the world by requiring compliance with 
common international rules. It brings together and complements the various existing 
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international agreements on intellectual property and extends the harmonisation by 
providing enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms. However, it is the 
intellectual property enforcement regime that has created the most controversy for 
China. Despite the substantive law, intellectual property infringement, commonly 
through the production of counterfeit goods, remains rampant in China. For 
example, in 2004, the value of Chinese counterfeits entering the United States 
market alone was US$ 134 million,3 and in both 2005 and 2006 infringement levels 
have reportedly not improved.4 This illustrates a divergence between the rule of law 
and its effective implementation within society. 
 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, China is required to implement effective enforcement 
procedures for the protection of intellectual property rights and to provide civil and 
criminal remedies that have a deterrent effect.5 It is the failure to adequately enforce 
intellectual property rights in China that is of current concern to Australia as the 
negotiation of the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) proceeds. This has 
been made quite plain in much of the Australian media commentary on the 
Australia-China FTA.6 Such concerns are certainly justified given the enormous 
volume and value of counterfeited or pirated goods produced in China and the 
associated loss to foreign trade mark and copyright owners in particular.  
 
China joined the WTO in November 2001. The potential growth of China upon 
accession to the WTO was of concern to developed nations. Accordingly, unlike 
developing nations able to take advantage of the transitional arrangements under the 
TRIPS Agreement, China was required to comply fully with the TRIPS Agreement 
upon accession.7 But the economic circumstances of China are quite unique. While 
having characteristics of a developing nation, China has experienced high rates of 
foreign investment and with that investment access to foreign technologies, trade 
marks and products mostly protected by intellectual property rights. Economic 
growth has led to an ever increasing ‘middle class’ with purchasing capacity for 
private homes, cars, education and holidays, not to mention luxury brand products.8 
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This ‘middle class’ in Chinese society has been determined to account for 19% of 
the population in 2003, 24.5% in 2005, with an expectation that 40% of the Chinese 
population will achieve ‘middle class’ status by 2020.9 Accordingly, one would 
expect that intellectual property rights protection and compliance should increase as 
the ability to pay the price of the ‘real’ product, as opposed to the counterfeit 
product, increases. But this has not been the experience thus far as counterfeits are 
travelling beyond China’s borders and into foreign markets. This is an interesting 
situation when China has been accused of maintaining import and distribution 
restrictions over legitimate foreign products and thereby providing incentives for 
the expansion of the counterfeit product market within its borders.10 Perhaps all that 
is needed is to further educate Chinese society about the significance of intellectual 
property rights, or persevere until enough Chinese citizens produce their own 
intellectual property to bring a change in attitude toward the protection of such 
intellectual property. In each case time is a significant factor, but Australia and 
China are negotiating a Free Trade Agreement now and the Australian 
manufacturing sector has expressed concerns over the current intellectual property 
regime in China and the impact of that regime on Australian exports to and 
investment in China.11  
 
It is the intellectual property enforcement regime that has been at the centre of 
criticism by intellectual property exporting nations. China has been requested to 
provide detailed information about its intellectual property rights enforcement 
efforts over the period 2001 to 2005. This request was made in October 2005 by the 
United States under Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.12 Similar requests have 
been made by Switzerland and Japan.13 China’s short response came in early 2006 
challenging the nature of the requests and requiring further clarification from each 
of the three nations.14 However, China did note its fulfilment of WTO obligations 
under Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement, the efforts of its ‘competent domestic 
IPR authorities’ to make ‘relevant information publicly available’, and the use of 
‘bilateral exchange and cooperation activities with WTO members’ to provide 
                                                 
9  Ibid. Statistics reported from The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
10  United States Trade Representative, 2006 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, 
11 December 2006, 78. 
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Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at 
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Conference in Shenzhen, China, 28-29 June 2006: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/ 
fta/060628_shenzhen_ridout.html> 18 August 2006. 
12  United States Trade Representative, 2005 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, 
11 December 2005, 66. The actual document containing the request is cited as IP/C/W/461, 14 
November 2005. 
13  Ibid. The Swiss request is cited as IP/C/W/462, 11 November, 2005, while the Japanese 
requested is cited as IP/C/W/463, 14 November, 2005. 
14  IP/C/W/465, 23 January 2006; IP/C/W/466, 23 January 2006; and IP/C/W/467, 23 January 
2006. 
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further information on their IPR legislation and enforcement.15 In addition, China 
could have reported on specific cases adjudicated in the higher courts, noted the 
efforts already made to strengthen the legal framework and improve the specialist 
tribunals in the judicial system, and provided a statistical analysis of the various 
‘front-line’ enforcement actions undertaken by agencies such as customs. The issue 
will be how effective these efforts have been and what more needs to be done to 
quell the enticing flame of piracy and bring about a change in behaviour. 
 
This article provides an overview of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime 
in China and considers the enforcement obligations under the TRIPS Agreement 
and the attitudes of three major intellectual property exporting countries to China’s 
track record in IPR enforcement. The evidentiary basis of these attitudes comes 
from WTO documentation and from US Trade Representative reports on TRIPS 
compliance and IPR enforcement activities.16 The article then turns to the unique 
circumstances in which Australia finds itself due to the negotiations of the 
Australia-China FTA and the drafting of the Intellectual Property Chapter. In 
response, an overview of China’s enforcement activities illustrates the apparent 
grand scale efforts of the authorities to deal with the IPR infringement crisis. 
However, progress is slow but in the scheme of things understandable when 
comparing the respective legal histories in IPR protection. 
 
II  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) REGIME IN CHINA 
 
A  Key Legislation 
 
It is well recognised that the introduction of intellectual property laws in China 
during the early days of the Open Door Policy was aimed to ‘meet the requirements 
of economic development and scientific advancement’.17 More specifically, if China 
was to attract foreign investment and technologies it had to demonstrate that it was 
capable of providing the necessary legal protection for such investment. This also 
resulted in China acceding to the numerous international conventions related to the 
protection of intellectual property rights18 culminating in membership of the TRIPS 
Agreement on 11 December 2001.19  
                                                 
15  Ibid. 
16  For a discussion on the role played by the US Trade Representative in applying unilateral 
pressure upon nations perceived not to be complying with their TRIPS obligations see Joshua J 
Simmons, ‘Cooperation and Coercion: The Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries’ (1999) 11 Bond LR 59.  
17  MOFCOM Report, I. Status Regarding Legislation in Terms of IPR in China, Tuesday, April 
05, 2005 Posted: 11:08 BJT (0308) GMT) <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/ 
print.shtml?/topic/sentence/200504/2005040003> 2 June 2005. 
18  Including the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Madrid Agreement and its Protocol, 
Universal Copyright Convention, Phonograms Convention, Patent Cooperation Treaty, UPOV 
Convention, Washington Integrated Circuits Treaty. 
19  MOFCOM Report, II. China’s Accession to International Conventions for the Protection of 
IPR and its Participation in International Negotiation about IPR, Tuesday, 5 April 2005 
Posted: 11:21 BJT (0321) GMT), <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/topic/ 
sentence/200504/2005040003> 2 June 2005. 
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There are three main pieces of legislation covering intellectual property rights in 
China. These are the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
Trademark Law of the PRC and the Copyright Law of the PRC. The three forms of 
intellectual property protected under these laws are expressly provided for under 
Articles 94-97 of the General Principles of the Civil Code. Each has its own 
regulations and implementing provisions,20 and each is administered by a different 
government authority, namely, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) for 
patents, utility models and designs, the Trade Mark Office within the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and the National Copyright 
Administration for China (NCAC). In addition, the Law Against Unfair 
Competition of the PRC provides protection in relation to trade names and unfair 
competition (known as passing off in common law jurisdictions), control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licences and the protection of undisclosed 
information. These laws were amended where necessary to ensure compliance with 
the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement before accession to the WTO.21 
However, it is not the letter of the law that has caused concern to foreign investors. 
The implementation of the laws, more particularly the enforcement of IPR, has 
received the most criticism as is discussed below. 
 
B  The Court System 
 
The Court system should be considered at this point. At the top of the court 
structure is the Supreme People’s Court. Next comes the High People’s Court, 
found in each province, autonomous region and municipality under authority of the 
central government. The Intermediate People’s Court follows in each major city and 
then at the bottom of the structure comes the Basic or Primary People’s Court found 
in each county, district and major city. While the court system is one of the three 
elements of governmental power in China, the concept of separation of powers is 
expressed somewhat differently to that understood in countries like Australia.22 
Wang Kui Hua suggests that the separation of powers in China resides in ‘a 
functional difference between the legislative, judicial and administrative arms of 
Government’.23 For example, judicial independence means that the political 
influence of the Chinese Communist Party is only present in the form of general 
policy directions rather than in actual decision-making.24 Meanwhile, in line with 
civil law influences, most notably the German Civil Code, the issue of judgments or 
opinions by the Supreme People’s Court does not constitute an interpretation of the 
law.25 Having said that, ‘Judge-made law’ in China is effectively confined to those 
judicial opinions issued by the Supreme People’s Court as official interpretations. 
                                                 
20  Including regulations pertaining to software, plant variety rights and circuit layouts. 
21  In addition, there are three significant regulations that have also been established, namely, the 
Regulations for Protection of New Varieties of Plant (1997), the Regulations on the Protection 
of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits (2001) and the Regulations for Protection of 
Computer Software (2001). 
22  K H Wang, Chinese Commercial Law (2000) 15-16. 
23  Ibid 16. 
24  Ibid 16. 
25  Ibid 16. 
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This is, perhaps the closest China’s judicial system comes to the common law 
concept of stare decisis (the doctrine of precedent), an important consideration 
when one realises that IPR cases are handled primarily in the lower courts. The first 
instance hearings take place either in the Intermediate People’s Court or the High 
People’s Court. Intellectual Property Tribunals or Trial Divisions were established 
in the courts from 1993 and renamed third civil tribunals in 2000 for infringement 
and contract disputes. Meanwhile, Administrative Tribunals became the forum for 
validity and ownership disputes.   
 
C  Administrative Measures 
 
The judicial system is not the only way that one can achieve IPR enforcement, 
administrative measures are also available. For example, the local administrations 
of the NCAC have had the power to initiate actions against infringers since 2002.26 
In the case of trade marks, the SAIC, or more likely its local authority (AIC), has 
the power to investigate and deal with trade mark infringements.27 In addition to 
ordering an infringer to immediately stop the infringing act, the AIC can impose a 
fine, confiscate and destroy the infringing articles, the tools used for the 
manufacture of those articles, and tools used for counterfeiting the representation 
for the registered trade mark.28 In relation to international trade, the China General 
Administration of Customs has provided an enforcement mechanism through its 
Border Protection Division for IP Protection established in 1995.29 Further, 
criminal infringement and piracy is handled by the various public security 
authorities through the Ministry of Public Security.  
 
With such a comprehensive IPR regime in operation, why then, is China 
failing to meet its WTO obligations to ensure effective IPR protection? To 
explore this, one needs to consider the obligations found under the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
III  COMPLYING WITH THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
 
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the ‘WTO 
Agreement’30 in 1995 symbolises a desire to converge trade principles in order to 
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. Part of this process was 
the recognition that intellectual property rights play a significant role in the 
                                                 
26  2003 saw a number of special actions taken with 150,000 executive staff dispatched to 
investigate markets, enterprises and schools: 12.9m products seized resulting in fines and 
business closures. 
27  Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, art 54. 
28  Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, art 53. 
29  MOFCOM Report, V. Status Regarding China’s Enforcement of IPR, Tuesday, 12 April 2005 
Posted: 14:38 BJT (0638) GMT) <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/sentence/ 
200504/20050400050082.html> 6 September 2006. 
30  The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, concluded 15 April 
1994. 
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promotion of international trade. Accordingly, members of the WTO are bound to 
another agreement found in Annex 1C of the WTO Agreement, namely, the TRIPS 
Agreement. Having its beginnings as part of the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),31 it was not until December of 1993 that 
the TRIPS Agreement was concluded providing international rules for the 
availability, scope, use and enforcement of intellectual property rights and for 
dispute prevention and settlement.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement recognises and reinforces the operation of the pre-exiting 
intellectual property conventions32 and ‘[desires] to establish a mutually supportive 
relationship … [with the World Intellectual Property Organisation and] … other 
relevant international organisations’.33 It should be noted that Members, when 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, ‘may, but shall not be obliged to, implement 
in their law more extensive protection than is required by [the TRIPS] Agreement, 
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of [that] 
Agreement’.34 While Members are given the freedom to ‘determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of … [the TRIPS Agreement] ... within 
their own legal system and practice’35 they are reminded of the objectives of the 
Agreement at Article 7: 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations. 
 
This statement of objectives goes to the core of the tension between the monopoly 
rights established through intellectual property regimes and the desire to engender 
free trade among nations. The art is in getting the balance right. But perhaps the 
most telling element of the success of a member’s intellectual property regime even 
after complying with the principles and standards harmonised under the TRIPS 
Agreement is the effectiveness of the enforcement regime. 
 
The enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are found in Part 3, 
comprising 5 Sections covering Articles 41-61. The general obligation is found in 
Article 41 reproduced below: 
 
                                                 
31  Commencing in 1986. 
32  See Part I of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
33  See the preamble or recitals to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
34  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art 1. This would seem to 
be aimed at those jurisdictions that have not taken such a liberal view of the breadth of subject 
matter capable of protection. In this regard, consider the European Patent Convention that 
prohibits the patenting of plant and animal varieties and developing nations that have refused 
to afford patent protection to pharmaceuticals. 
35  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art 1. 
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1 Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are 
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be 
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse. 
 
2 Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be 
fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or 
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 
 
3 Decisions on the merits of a case shall preferably be in writing and reasoned. 
They shall be made available at least to the parties to the proceeding without 
undue delay. Decisions on the merits of a case shall be based only on 
evidence in respect of which parties were offered the opportunity to be heard. 
 
4 Parties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial 
authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional 
provisions in a Member’s law concerning the importance of a case, of at least 
the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case. However, 
there shall be no obligation to provide an opportunity for review of acquittals 
in criminal cases. 
 
5 It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a 
judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct 
from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity 
of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any 
obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in 
general. 
 
It is arguable that China’s IPR system has failed against the majority of the 
principles found in Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement. China has been required to 
address the issue of enforcement by a number of countries. More specifically, the 
United States of America, Switzerland and Japan have each invoked the operation 
of Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requesting information from China 
regarding the publication of ‘Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application’.36 
 
It is an understatement to say that the United States of America is unhappy with 
China’s progress on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. This is 
emphasised by the action of the United States submitting the request under Article 
63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement in late 2005, seeking to obtain information on 
China’s enforcement efforts. The request was targeted at judicial decisions or 
administrative rulings on intellectual property rights related matters. The 
justification for this action was succinctly expressed by the US Trade 
                                                 
36  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art 63.1. 
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Representative (USTR), Rob Portman, in a press release made on 25 October 2005 
in Geneva: 
 
Based on all available information, piracy and counterfeiting remain rampant in 
China despite years of engagement on this issue. If China believes that it is doing 
enough to protect intellectual property, then it should view this process as a chance to 
prove its case … Our goal is to get detailed information that will help pinpoint 
exactly where the enforcement system is breaking down so we can decide 
appropriate next steps.37 
 
Lack of transparency has been cited as an acute problem in relation to obtaining 
sufficient information about enforcement activities in China.38 This is all the more 
poignant when infringement levels are quoted at 90% in the USTR’s Special 301 
Report39 published in April 2005.40 The report comprises data and details of 
experiences collected through submissions of interested stakeholders or industry 
groups. For example: 
 
Several OCR submissions express concern regarding the Chinese Government’s 
unwillingness to provide sufficiently detailed enforcement information. For example, 
one industry group observed that ‘[a]lthough Chinese authorities have undertaken 
some administrative enforcement actions against pirates, the Government’s refusal to 
share information about ... the ultimate outcomes of these actions makes it very 
difficult for rights holders to assess the deterrent impact of China’s enforcement 
efforts’.41 
 
The April 2006 Special 301 Report was not much more encouraging indicating that 
levels of copyright piracy in China were between 85 and 93 percent, with estimated 
US business software losses in 2005 representing US$1.27 billion, only US$210 
million less from 2004.42 As for the motion picture industry, piracy is said to have 
‘reached almost 100 percent of the retail market in China’.43 But the sale of 
                                                 
37  USTR Press Release 2005-65, 26 October 2005. 
38  USTR, Special 301 Report, Out of Cycle Review of China, 29 April 2005. 
39  This is an annual report prepared pursuant to section 182 and under the Special 301 provisions 
of the Trade Act 1974 as amended. The USTR has the obligation to ‘identify those countries 
that deny adequate and effective protection for IPR or deny fair and equitable market access 
for persons that rely on intellectual property protection’ (See Background on Special 301, 2006 
Special 301 Report). China is currently under the Priority Watch List and therefore the focus 
of bilateral attention in order to deal with the identified IPR problems. The significance of the 
Special 301 mechanism is that it provides the US with the power to coerce the implementation 
of stronger intellectual property protection by the offending state through the threat of trade 
restrictions and may go as far as invoking the WTO dispute settlement processes even where 
the country is recognised as TRIPS-compliant: for a detailed discussion see Simons, above n 
16.  
40  USTR, Special 301 Report, Out of Cycle Review of China, 29 April 2005, 2. 
41  Ibid 3. 
42  USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report 17 <http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/Section_index.html> 1 May 2006. 
43  Susan Krause, ‘Legislators Detail Concerns About Counterfeit Goods from China: Theft of 
Intellectual Property has Significant Impact on Revenue, Jobs’, Washington File, US 
Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, 12 June 2006. 
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counterfeit products in China is not the only concern, the export of counterfeits 
from China is a significant problem around the globe. In the 2006 Special 301 
Report, it was noted that 69 percent of infringing products seized at the US border 
were of Chinese origin accounting for US$63.9 million in 2005.44 Clearly Chinese 
customs enforcement mechanisms are failing to secure effective border 
enforcement. 
 
Transparency in the process of rule-making has also been quoted as a failure of the 
Chinese IPR system.45 For example, draft rules have not been made available for 
public comment but have been provided to selected organisations only for 
comment.46 The result can only be inconsistency. But most evidently, China’s 
criminal IPR enforcement system has failed to achieve the deterrent effect required 
for compliance with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.47 This has been the case 
despite high level government commitment to addressing counterfeiting and piracy 
problems in China.48 Administrative enforcement has accounted for 99% of 
copyright and trade mark cases with less than one percent of these cases being 
transferred to the Public Security Bureau for criminal prosecution.49 It has been 
claimed that administrative fines are too low and merely constitute a cost of doing 
business for the infringers.50 Patent cases, on the other hand, rely more heavily on 
civil enforcement procedures which have been accused of being ‘inefficient and 
unpredictable’.51 The failings of the civil court system have been summed up as 
follows: 
 
Litigants have found that most judges lack necessary technical training, court rules 
regarding evidence, expert witnesses, and protection of confidential information are 
vague or ineffective, and the costs of investigation and bringing cases are 
prohibitively high.52 
 
On the issue of transparency article 63 paragraph 1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
requires that  
 
Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of 
general application, made effective by a Member pertaining to the subject matter of 
this Agreement (the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement and prevention of 
the abuse of intellectual property rights) shall be published, or where such 
publication is not practicable made publicly available, in a national language, in such 
a manner as to enable governments and right holders to become acquainted with 
them ... 
 
                                                 
44  USTR, above n 42. 
45  USTR, Special 301 Report, Out of Cycle Review of China, 29 April 2005, 3. 
46  USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report, 24. 
47  USTR, Special 301 Report, Out of Cycle Review of China, 29 April 29, 2005, 3. 
48  Ibid 4. See also below. 
49  USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report 18. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid 21.  
52  Ibid. 
 Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in the People’s Republic of China 255 
Uncertainty due to lack of transparency poses the greatest difficulty for foreign 
owners of intellectual property to understand the enforcement regime in China. 
Judgments are short and historically only a few cases were made public and of 
those only a few in a foreign language such as English. For example, the Beijing 
High People’s Court announced and briefly described the 10 top IPR cases in 2003-
2004, the majority of which were Chinese nationals versus Chinese nationals.53 This 
can hardly be representative when in the Beijing courts alone there were nearly 
1,400 IPR cases dealt with during the first eleven months of 2004. Now judgments 
for intellectual property cases can be obtained on the internet through a dedicated 
site in the Chinese language.54 The question is, should these judgments be made 
available in other languages to satisfy the TRIPS requirement of transparency? 
 
Short judgments are what one would expect of a legal system based on civil law 
traditions such as in France. However, the Chinese legal system has been influenced 
by German based civil law traditions and Soviet socialist law traditions (which in 
turn have their basis in civil law).55 German court opinions can be comparable to 
English-based common law decisions not only discussing the relevant legislation 
but also prior cases and often academic dissertations. Why China has not followed 
this tradition could be attributable to the fact that its private law judiciary is at the 
early stages of its development and training and will require a longer period to 
establish a comparable judicial tradition. As for decisions being made available in 
the English language or other languages other than in Chinese to satisfy 
transparency requirements, the TRIPS Agreement, at article 63.1, only requires 
publication in the national language. Surely it is up to those engaging in the Chinese 
legal system to ensure they have adequate representation able to explain results in 
the language of the foreign owner of IPR. However, it is arguable that China has set 
a precedent of multilingual expectation. The foreign investment and technology 
transfer contracts entered into under Chinese laws may be drafted in more than one 
language, namely, one in the Chinese language and others in the language of the 
foreign investors, with all versions being considered equally effective.56 But a 
language barrier alone could not be responsible for a belief of lack of transparency 
in relation to judicial decisions. Rather, transparency under article 63.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement is concerned with informing governments and rights holders of 
the ‘final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application’, 
namely, the general principles that can be gleaned from those judgments. Does ‘in a 
manner as to enable governments and rights holders to be acquainted with’ such 
general principles require language accessibility? It is arguable that since the WTO 
                                                 
53  State Intellectual property Office, Beijing reports top 10 IPR cases,  
<http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/gfxx/iprspecial/t20041220_37538.htm> 25 January 
2005. 
54  Xinhua News Agency, Court Decisions Go online in Beijing, 6 November 2003, 
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56  See, for example, Article 125 of the Contract Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China 1999. 
Note that where the versions are not identical, a purposive construction is to be used according 
to Article 125. 
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operates in English, French and Spanish,57 members, in turn, ought to be providing 
the relevant information required under article 63.1 in one of these three languages. 
However, the requests made under Article 63.3 make no specific mention of 
language. 
 
In its initial response to the Article 63.3 requests by the United States, Switzerland 
and Japan, China made the statement that ‘it is not in a position to provide any such 
‘judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application’ as ‘China does 
not follow the common law system’.58 This is an extraordinary claim when one 
recognises that the TRIPS Agreement applies to WTO member nations of both civil 
law and common law systems, as noted by Switzerland, a civil law country, in its 
response. Accordingly, Switzerland clarifies as follows: 
 
Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement being applicable to all WTO Members, we 
interpret Article 63.1 and 3 as referring to final judicial decisions in the sense of 
decisions which have become legally binding because they have either not been 
appealed or were rendered by the court of final instance.59 
 
China’s initial response provided further resistance including arguing that the 
request for information regarding IPR enforcement cases identified by China for the 
period 2001 to 2004 in China’s own documentation to the TRIPS Council was not 
sufficiently specific as required under Article 63.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.60 Each 
of the United States, Switzerland and Japan noted in their response to China’s 
request for clarification that no further specificity was required as China had 
already identified the cases to the TRIPS Council in successive reviews and 
particularly in China’s white paper distributed to the Council immediately prior to 
the Article 63.3 Requests.61  
Resistance turned into cooperation when China invited the United States to 
participate in constructive discussions to improve IPR enforcement transparency in 
March 2006.62 The result has been the provision of ‘previously unavailable IPR 
criminal prosecution data’ and a commitment to provide IPR enforcement statistics 
to the public in both Chinese and English.63 While this is a step forward it is clearly 
not a complete response to the Article 63.3 requests, however, China’s Action Plan 
                                                 
57  See The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, concluded 15 
April, 1994 
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62  USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report, 24. 
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of IPR Protection 2006 does suggest further work will be undertaken to satisfy 
those requests.64   
 
IV  IPR ISSUES FOR AN AUSTRALIA-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
 
What does this mean for Australia, currently involved in negotiations with China 
for a Free Trade Agreement? Following the completion of a joint feasibility study, 
Australia and China agreed on 18 April 2005 to launch negotiations on a bilateral 
free trade agreement. Australia had already gone down that pathway with the 
United States of America and certain sectors of Australian industry are still reeling 
from the effect on the intellectual property regime, particularly the strengthening of 
copyright through, for example, increasing the period of protection from 50 to 70 
years (over an above the life of the author), digital rights management and 
technological protection measures, and the broadening of criminal liability.65 It is 
not unusual for a bilateral agreement with the US to result in ‘TRIPS – plus’ 
obligations being adopted in the agreement’s intellectual property chapter.66 
However, this means that if Australia has introduced an enhanced regime of 
intellectual property protection there might therefore be an expectation that other 
countries with which Australia concludes a free trade agreement would follow suit. 
It is not surprising then that the Australian Government has not put a timeframe on 
negotiations with China. Instead, the Australian Government is committed to ‘spend 
as much time as is required to negotiate a high-quality agreement that contains 
commercially meaningful outcomes for Australian businesses and is consistent with 
the rules of the World Trade Organisation’.67 To this end, community consultation 
has played a significant role in the negotiation process on the part of the Australian 
Government. However, prior to the decision to commence negotiations with China, 
Australian business spoke out about the issue of IPR protection in China calling for 
‘China and Australia to set up an IP monitoring and dispute panel’.68 A similar 
suggestion has been made by the chief executive of the Australian Industry Group, 
Heather Ridout, at the Australia-China FTA Conference in Shenzhen, 28-29 June 
2006. The suggestion, put forward on the Australian Industry Group’s behalf, is for: 
 
The establishment of an ongoing bilateral consultative and referral mechanism to 
address the particular IP concerns of Australian business people regarding IP rights 
infringement in or from China. In this regard, the Australian Industry Group has for 
some time advocated that as an early investment in the FTA process, Australia and 
                                                 
64  See below. 
65  See Chapter 17, Australia/United States Free Trade Agreement, and Schedules 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9 
of the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 with the resultant amendments to 
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Property’ (2001) 4 Journal of World Intellectual Property 791.  
67  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-China FTA Negotiations: Launch of 
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2006. 
68  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Business calls for IP monitoring in 
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258 MqJBL (2007) Vol 4 
China agree to set up now a dedicated IP panel that could focus on implementation 
issues hindering Australian companies.69 
 
However, these suggestions do not provide a mechanism for such a body, rather, the 
Australia/United States Free Trade Agreement may provide a model along the basis 
of its Standard Technical Working Group on Animal and Plant Health Measures as 
suggested by Mauger and Stoianoff.70 Further, in recent negotiations between 
Australia and China regarding the free trade agreement, Australia has repeatedly 
made a case for the inclusion of provisions regarding a ‘consultative mechanism on 
intellectual property’ but little progress has been noted.71 
 
Other submissions by the Australian manufacturing sector have brought to light 
specific problems concerning the Chinese IPR regime. These include ‘insufficient 
penalties for deterrence; undue delays in cases involving foreign companies and 
complex technologies, inconsistent application of intellectual property across 
provinces; and inconsistencies between Australian and Chinese patent law 
regimes’.72 These have been described in greater detail providing a picture not 
dissimilar to that painted by United States reports as mentioned above. However, 
Australian complaints go a step further citing lack of transparency and consistency 
in the registration processes.73 Clearly, this is a failure to provide effective IPR 
protection from the outset and suggests a lack of training and adequate systems. 
 
The negotiations for an Australia-China Free Trade Agreement provide an 
opportunity to improve China’s IPR system. This could be achieved through the 
drafting of a dedicated chapter on Intellectual Property addressing the failings of the 
current IPR regime in China through a bench-marking process effectively requiring 
that China’s systems of IPR protection and enforcement meet specified standards. 
Specific shortcomings in the laws and their implementation, institutional 
deficiencies and lack of consistency could be dealt with in a carefully drafted 
Intellectual Property Chapter. Clearly, the degree to which such an ambitious 
objective can be achieved depends on the weighing up of competing interests and at 
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present there are ‘strong differences’ in the approaches of each country to the 
drafting of the Intellectual Property Chapter.74 
 
On the whole Australia is an intellectual property importer rather than exporter. 
Australian exports are predominantly based on resources and agriculture that need 
markets.75 China provides a significant market for Australian resources and 
agriculture albeit a protected market.76 Removing the trade barriers for such exports 
will be of greater significance to the Australian negotiators than improving China’s 
IPR protection regime. However, that does not mean that both cannot be achieved, 
particularly since, 
 
China is now Australia’'s 4th largest export market for manufactures, reflecting 
China's increasing demand for imported inputs into its expanding manufacturing 
sector and Australia's capacity to supply the Chinese market competitively.77 
 
Together with Australia’s intellectual property obligations under the Australia-US 
Free Trade Agreement, the interests of Australia’s manufacturing sector should 
provide sufficient influence for the negotiators to aim high when negotiating the 
Intellectual Property Chapter for the Australia-China Free Trade Agreement. To-
date, China’s offer of trade liberalisation with respect to goods has not met 
Australia’s expectations78 and this degree of protectionism may well be responsible 
for the ongoing high levels of infringement experienced by foreign IPR holders 
attempting to access the Chinese market.79 However, for the negotiations to be 
meaningful, China’s IPR enforcement activities would need to be determined and 
analysed for deficiencies that the Intellectual Property Chapter could address. The 
following outlines China’s enforcement activities and attempts to explain the 
deficiencies. 
 
V  CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
 
It is through the administrative pathways that the most action has taken place in 
relation to intellectual property rights enforcement in China. This is probably due to 
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the fact that administrative enforcement actions cost the intellectual property owner 
less than civil judicial actions and return faster results.80 However, whether the 
result is a fine or compensation the questions of adequacy and deterrent effect come 
up time and time again. These are important considerations when analysing the 
volume of enforcement activity in China. For example, in 2004, the Public Security 
Bureau, which carries out criminal enforcement, recorded the resolution of 30,000 
infringement and piracy cases comprising the seizure of 130 million infringing and 
pirated publications, the closure of 21 assembly lines for illegal disc production and 
the banning of more than 2,960 illegal printeries.81 The numbers of cases resolved in 
2005 increased to 36,000 with a further 17 assembly lines for illegal discs having 
been ‘confiscated’ together with millions of copies of pirated discs.82 The audio-
video market has also seen significant enforcement action in 2005 through cultural 
administration authorities in China resulting in over 136 million copies of pirated 
audio-video products confiscated and over 66.21 million copies having been 
destroyed.83 
 
The above statistics illustrate copyright enforcement. Customs investigations, on the 
other hand, have been predominantly concerned with trade mark infringements, 
accounting for 1,106 cases in 2005, compared to patent infringements accounting 
for 37 cases and copyright infringements accounting for 67 cases.84 Of the total 
cases, only 51 were related to imports while 1159 cases were export related.85 This 
proportion would explain the alarming numbers of counterfeit products originating 
from China and entering other countries.86 
 
China has certainly projected a strong commitment to IPR protection and the 
international convergence of this field of law, and this is evident at the highest 
levels. In 2004 the State Council of China established The Lead Group of IPR 
Protection comprising twelve central authorities that have some form of 
engagement with intellectual property protection.87 Operating at national level 
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down to the local level, this body has the responsibility to direct and coordinate IPR 
protection issues.88 The achievements illustrated by the above authorities 
demonstrate a concerted effort of enforcement actions from the national to the local 
level. Publicity activities have also been utilised to improve public awareness of 
IPR protection in China.89 And while the usefulness of such activities has been 
called into question, they remain an integral part of current government initiatives 
in China. 
 
China’s Action Plan of IPR Protection 2006 (the Action Plan) is the current 
initiative to improve intellectual property protection in China.90 The Action Plan 
was formulated by the National IPR Protection Working Group Office working 
together with the other relevant government departments.91 The Action Plan covers 
four major spheres, namely, copyright, patents, trade marks, and import/export.92 
Legislation will either be revised and improved or newly formulated as will relevant 
judicial interpretations.93 Intellectual property law enforcement efforts have been 
specified including seven dedicated campaigns.94 A service centre is to be 
established for the reporting of intellectual property violations and a significant 
number of measures will be undertaken to improve public awareness of intellectual 
property rights protection.95 Personnel engaged in intellectual property rights 
protection will have 21 training programs available to them as well as 19 
international exchange and cooperation activities.96 The promotion of enterprise 
self-discipline and the provision of services to rights holders are also dealt with in 
the Action Plan as is the plan to conduct countermeasure oriented research.97 
 
With such a concerted effort to ensure IPR protection is achieved in compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement, why then, is China perceived as failing to meet its 
WTO obligations? The example of the difficulty of enforcing judgments generally 
in China may provide some insight. While 90 percent of civil and criminal 
judgments by Beijing courts have been enforced during the period 2003 to 2006, the 
national levels of enforcement paint another picture.98 Enforcement rates for civil 
judgments nationally have been noted at 40 percent for High People’s Courts, 50 
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percent for Intermediate People’s Courts and 60 percent for the Basic or Primary 
People’s Courts.99  When one considers that IPR cases constitute a small proportion 
of these judgments, the failure to enforce judgments generally can be recognised as 
endemic.100 Certainly one can expect that the more economically underdeveloped 
the region is the lower the rate of enforcement of civil judgments.101 But corruption 
and protectionism at the local level generally are significant factors that need to be 
taken into account when intellectual property rights are sought to be enforced in 
locations outside the cities where more sophisticated regimes are in place.102 
Despite the prosecution of corrupt judges for the acceptance of bribes,  
 
[t]oday, courts remain ineffectual because local judges are literally in the pocket of 
local governments, which pay their wages and routinely influence decisions. Most 
people have little chance of a fair hearing against anyone with government 
connections.103 
 
This, coupled with the fact that IPR cases, civil, administrative and criminal 
together, represent approximately 0.3 percent of all cases dealt with annually in 
China, brings the importance of IPR enforcement into perspective.104 The Chief 
Justice of the IPR Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court, Jiang Zhipei, points out 
that ‘China is still a developing country’ despite its many developed cities.105 
Accordingly, 
 
[t]here are more urgent issues to be addressed than IP protection’ when one considers 
that ‘there are still many places where people don’t have enough to eat and there is a 
big imbalance in terms of economic development and people’s lives in China as a 
whole.106  
 
Despite such sentiment, Chief Justice Jiang maintains a personal website, Judicial 
Protection of IPR in China, in both Chinese and English, providing the latest IPR 
laws and regulations, judgments, trial news, case analyses, and personal responses 
to questions posted on the website by the public.107 This is perhaps a gallant attempt 
at contributing toward the transparency required under the TRIPS Agreement, albeit 
unofficial,108 but it also adds to general public awareness building.  
 
                                                 
99  Ibid. 
100  Ibid 693. 
101  Ibid 686. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Ibid 686-687, quoting David Murphy of the Far Eastern Economic Review. 
104  Ibid 693. 
105  Ibid 692. 
106  Ibid. 
107  See the English version of the website <http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/>. Note that it is 
not as up-to-date as the Chinese version.  
108  However, Slate’s analysis of the website proposes that it is aimed at Americans and is intended 
‘to convey that the Chinese judiciary is becoming more transparent and predictable with 
regards to IPR matters … and that the government is giving senior IPR judges more 
independence’, Slate, above n 99, 697. 
 Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in the People’s Republic of China 263 
The concept of intellectual property is not a natural one in Chinese society. 
Confucian ideals expressed ‘that true scholars wrote for edification and moral 
renewal rather than profit’.109 Chinese painters have been described as tolerant 
toward forgers of their works noting that ‘[s]uch copying …bore witness to the 
quality of the work copied and to its creator’s degree of understanding and 
civility’.110 Intellectual creation is believed to have its origins in the past and 
therefore ‘no later author may claim exclusive rights over it’.111 This ideal is 
expressed a little differently in socialist societies, namely, ‘that intellectual creation 
or invention was a product based upon a repository of knowledge that belonged to 
all members of society and thus a product of the larger society’.112 This then implies 
that Chinese society, which was built on Confucian ideology and adopted socialist 
ideologies in more recent times, has been asked to expunge thousands of years of a 
collective doctrine in favour of the private property rights doctrine protecting 
individual creation embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. Twenty years does not seem 
so long in the scheme of things. 
 
However, a more cynical view of the failings of Chinese IPR enforcement is that 
there is no incentive for China to enforce IPR laws while the country is in 
development. It has been suggested ‘that China will steal as much as it can until it 
can produce its own technology’.113 But Chinese businesses are producing their own 
technology and other forms of intellectual property and are defending their rights 
through the court system.114 However, the technology is predominantly low level 
and protected by utility models or industrial designs rather than standard patents.115 
It is suggested that when a critical mass of higher technology producers is achieved 
in China the benefits of IPR protection will be recognised and bring about a cultural 
change in attitude toward enforcement. At present, nearly half of China’s labour 
force is in agriculture.116 Meanwhile, ‘tens of millions of manufacturing jobs’ in 
China were lost since the mid-1990s.117 How does this reconcile with China’s 
immense economic growth ‘accounting for a quarter of the world’s total economic 
growth over the last two years’ and becoming ‘the world’s 3rd largest trading nation 
after the United States and Germany’?118 One must recognise that of the 1.3 billion 
people living in China a sizable proportion are still living in poverty and earning 
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‘less than US$2 a day’.119 The United States did not provide protection for foreign 
copyrighted materials until after its ‘developing’ period and was for the most part of 
the 19th century a significant infringer of European copyright works.120 The United 
States now finds itself in Europe’s position more than 100 years ago. The question 
is whether China is in the position the United States was during that ‘developing’ 
period and whether such a comparison is valid in today’s globalised world. This is 
particularly relevant when one considers the latest complaint by the USTR, namely 
that China’s import restrictions and restrictions placed on the wholesale and retail 
distribution of legitimate foreign products is considered to exacerbate the 
infringement of those very products in China by enabling the domination of 
counterfeit products in the Chinese market.121 Accordingly, China’s protectionist 
position together with its failure to provide deterrent criminal remedies stands 
contrary to the principle of national treatment122 and the aim of freer trade among 
nations.   
 
VI  CONCLUSION: CONVERGENT LAW DIVERGENT BEHAVIOUR? 
 
This article has illustrated the immense effort that the Chinese Government has 
made to develop a complete IPR system in the space of 20 years. But complying 
with an ever converging international IPR system required under the TRIPS 
Agreement has proven to be inadequate. This has been demonstrated by the 
numerous accounts of foreign IPR holders having to deal with a rampant 
counterfeiting culture in China and the attempts by nation states to deal with these 
issues directly with China. The question arises, why does this cultural acceptance of 
counterfeiting and piracy continue to exist despite the laws, the publicity 
campaigns, and despite the operations of the security forces and customs 
departments? Can Confucian ideology and/or socialist ideology be to blame? 
Perhaps, but China is operating in the 21st century, benefiting from globalisation 
and contributing to it in a significant way. The system is described as corrupt and 
protectionist and the penalties for IPR infringement in China are considered 
inadequate and have been accused of failing to meet Article 61 requirements. The 
economic influences and the lack of political will to make real change at an 
institutional and structural level would seem to be more feasible explanations for 
China’s perceived failure to comply with TRIPS obligations. However, China 
opened its doors to the world less than 30 years ago and has embarked on a massive 
transformation into a market economy that recognises private property rights on the 
one hand but at the same time is governed under socialist principles. Ultimately, it 
is a case of the world’s most populous country striving for rapid economic 
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development and thereby choosing to tip the balance in favour of society rather than 
the individual. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
